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Recently, it came as a surprise to learn that many tech companies are turning to humans to tran-
scribe and analyze audio recordings in order to improve their speech assistance systems. This case 
is remarkable, not only because it has sparked debate over privacy issues, but also because a hood-
winked public has rediscovered the human practices at the heart of what is supposedly digital—a 
narcissistic injury afflicting socially overestimated notions of technological performance. 
 
This case illustrates one of the many challenges that digitalization poses for sociological theory: the 
question of the capacity to act. Do workers act like algorithms or do the algorithms perform ac-
tions? What potential for action does the digital have? The concept of action in methodological in-
dividualism, with its restriction to the rationally acting and meaning-seeking individual, seems to be 
reaching its limits in the face of complex interlinkages between human and nonhuman elements.  
 
In the paper, I propose to analyze (1.) digital culture proceeding from the concept of practice. The 
sociological theory of practice (with its roots in American pragmatism and Ludwig Wittgenstein's 
late philosophy, shaped by Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens, and now systematized into a the-
oretical movement) offers an alternative research program to established sociological concepts. In 
contrast to the concept of action, practice theory decenters the acting subject: The subject's ability to 
act is due to historically preexisting practices that have shifted in time and space and are taken up 
and repeated by the subject. In the process, artefacts are also brought into focus as participants in 
action. Thus, practice theory enables an analytical consideration of nonhuman elements; however, it 
reserves the concept of practice for humans, since its focus so far has been on physical performance 
and embodied knowledge. 
 
On this basis, I develop (2.) a modification of the theory of practice that places its focus on the repe-
tition and identification of patterns of practice—a potential that is also available to digital programs, 
so that we can also speak of “digital practices” and carry out a symmetrical analysis of human and 
nonhuman elements. 
 
As described in the call, the debate on digitalization often oscillates between promises of salvation 
and cultural pessimism, with the extent and consequences of digitization often being either over- or 
underestimated. Starting from a praxeological perspective, I develop and interrelate (3.) two hy-
potheses with each other: The strong hypothesis that algorithms and software themselves have the 
capacity to act will be complemented by a relativizing hypothesis, according to which they only 
have this capacity in the context of human practice: a) Algorithms repeat or replace practices such 
as calculating, comparing, and evaluating, b) they do so because of programming that reproduces 
 
social power relations, c) they are only relevant by entering into human practices, by being pro-
grammed, used, and received and by changing the form and intensity of previously nondigital prac-
tices. At this point, a particular achievement of the digital is also highlighted, which explains its 
rapid and widespread dissemination: the ability to interlink and reconfigure practices. 
 
Finally, I will demonstrate (4.) the analytical benefit of a shift from actions to practices and, within 
practice theory, from physical performance to repetition and identification via selected case studies 
such as the one described above. The symmetrical description of human and nonhuman elements of 
practice can open up sociological questions for consideration, such as: What difference does it make 
for participants whether a human, a bot, or an algorithm “acts”? What consequences does this have 
for the attribution of responsibility? What effects does this have on society's perception of digitali-
zation? 
 
